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I
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that construction is a form of legalized gambling.' Annually,
thousands of architects, contractors, and subcontractors declare bankruptcy 2 while
projects are abandoned because owners lack the funds needed for completion. The
high-risk nature of the construction industry is attributable to various factors.
First, an error in construction involving relatively inexpensive materials or work-
manship may require remedial work far more expensive than that first performed.
When such an error is not discovered until late in the construction process, the cost
of repair or replacement is likely to be disproportionately high.3 Second, the inter-
dependency of the many trades and professions involved in a project means that
delays or problems in one aspect of the process may cause substantial loss to a
sizeable number of these parties. Third, the high number of unforeseeable events
which may intervene to delay construction increases the risk involved. In addition
to the obvious problem of inclement weather, the risk of negligent error by a con-
tractor or other party always exists. The risk of nonnegligent error-that which
could not be avoided even with the exercise of due care-is also present. 4
The owner has traditionally borne the risk of loss since he is the one who initi-
ates the entire construction process. 5 Given the magnitude of the risk involved, the
owner is continually seeking to limit the risk to which he is exposed. Risk-
Copyright © 1983 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. Sinnott, Insurance for Construction Projects, in REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTION CURRENT PROBLEMS
175, 175 (PLI ed. 1973).
2. Dun & Bradstreet reports that 2,710 contracting firms failed in 1981. In the first seven months of
1982, 2,206 contractors declared bankruptcy. Failures Hit 50 Year High, ENG'G NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 9,
1982, at 68.
3. For example, an improper window sealant was used in building San Francisco's Embarcadero
Center. The ineffectiveness of the sealant was not discovered until construction was almost completed at
which time replacement of the sealant cost approximately a quarter of a million dollars. Habenicht &
Howlett v. Jones-Allen-Dillingham, No. I Civ. 46449, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1981).
4. Although the sealant in the Embarcadero Center was apparently recommended by the manufac-
turer for the intended use, approved by the architect, and applied according to instructions, the sealant was
ineffective. Id at 5, 9. Although the purchaser would have had a warranty action against the manufac-
turer, none of the parties involved in the lawsuit was at fault.
5. See Goldberg, The Owner's Duty to Coordinate Mlullt-Prme Construction Contractors, A Condition of Coopera-
lion, 28 EMORN L.J. 377 (1979).
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spreading methods which benefit parties other than the owner are generally
accepted; payment bonds and errors and omissions insurance for design profes-
sionals are two such methods. Some other risk-spreading methods are limited in
their availability. For example, "no damages for delay" clauses are valid with
respect to occurrences beyond the contractor's control, such as weather, but are
not valid with respect to the owner's active interference with the progress of the
work. 6 No mechanism has been developed for allocating the risk of nonnegligent
error. 7
The owner's desire to limit risk does not exist in a vacuum, however. The
owner generally has four other major concerns in a construction project: (1) that
the end product be a well-built structure of high quality, (2) that the project be
completed on time, (3) that the project be constructed at the contract price, and
(4) that the property be protected from liens which hinder the owner's ability to
raise capital and can even result in loss of the property.
The emergence of construction management in the 1960's8 presents the owner
with one method which seems to achieve all his objectives. The construction man-
ager (CM) brings to the process the expertise necessary to ensure quality while
being particularly sensitive to the owner's desire to limit the time for and cost of
completion. 9 By delegating to the CM the duty to schedule and coordinate work,
the owner may attempt to shift the risk in those areas to the CM. However, while
courts have reacted in varied ways to the legal implications of construction man-
agement, they have generally been reluctant to allow the risks of construction or
the duty to coordinate to be shifted from the owner to the CM. Whether this
absence of risk-shifting is consonant with the philosophy of construction manage-
ment and the public policy concerning allocation of risk is the subject of this
article. i0
This article takes the viewpoint of the owner, since he is the party most con-
cerned with allocation of risk. However, "owners" as a whole have too many
divergent characteristics to be considered as a single category. The most impor-
tant difference among owners is the frequency with which they build. The public
owner who builds frequently falls into a category separate from one including the
private or public owner who builds only occasionally. The amount of construction
with which the owners are involved makes these categories different in two impor-
tant respects: degree of expertise and degree of influence.
When the owner is the United States Government, for example, a great deal of
expertise is available. The Public Building Service of the General Services Admin-
istration (GSA PBS) has a large staff with numerous years of construction experi-
ence. Those owners with only occasional experience with construction, however,
6. See, e.g., John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 500 F. Supp. 910 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
8. Sneed, The Construction Manager's Lzabih'o, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION 317, 317 (PLI ed. 1981).
9. Id. at 325-26.
10. While the role of the CM takes various forms (ree i. at 329-35), in this article the CM is envi-
sioned as a prime contractor who serves not as an agent of the owner but as an independent manager and
coordinator of the construction process.
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have little opportunity to develop expertise in the field. Indeed, a substantial por-
tion of the construction in this country is done at the behest of owners who are not
regularly involved in sizeable building projects." This large group might be
called "private owners" except that most state and local governments are similarly
situated with respect to their lack of expertise. Thus, for the purposes of this
article, private owners and state and local governments will be referred to as "non-
professional owners."
Another distinguishing characteristic of the nonprofessional owner is his lack of
representation by trade organizations. Contractors are represented by the
National Constructors Organization, the Associated Building Contractors, and the
Associated General Contractors (AGC). Design professionals are represented by
the National Society of Professional Engineers, the American Society of Civil Engi-
neers, and the American Institute of Architects (AIA). Subcontractors are repre-
sented by the American Subcontractors Association, the Specialty Trade
Association of America, and various other industry groups. This representation
provides an influential voice in the passage of legislation beneficial to that partic-
ular group. Moreover, these and other actors in the construction field often have
their own standard form contracts. The powerful AIA has developed a set of docu-
ments, as has the AGC. The GSA PBS also has its own set of contracts more
favorable to the owner. Since the duties and liabilities of the parties are deter-
mined by the terms of their contracts, the existence of such documents has wide-
spread implications. The nonprofessional owner has neither a united lobbying
voice nor standard form contracts to protect his interests. Therefore, this article
takes the viewpoint of the nonprofessional owner.
II
BARRIERS TO OWNER'S DELEGATION OF THE DUTY TO COORDINATE
A. Historical Origins and the Liability of the Owner Today Under the AIA,
AGC, and GSA PBS Contracts
The owner's duty to coordinate originated during the Industrial Revolution in
England in the 1830's. 12 In one of the earliest cases, 13 an owner was held to have
unjustly refused payment to a contractor where the delay in completion was the
fault of another contractor. Within a few years, this idea had evolved into a sepa-
rate cause of action by the delayed contractor against the owner for delays attribu-
table to another contractor.14 The root of the decisions was that site access, to be
furnished by the owner, was a prerequisite for the contractor's completion in the
time established in the contract.15 From this predicate the courts derived the prin-
11. In 1981, $237,087,000,000 worth of new construction was put in place. Of that amount,
$59,747,000,000 was private nonresidential. The public sector accounted for $53,536,000,000. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION REPORTS-VALUE OF NEW CONSTRUCTION
PUT IN PLACE 3 (Apr. 1982).
12. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 379.
13. Holme v. Guppy, 150 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1838).
14. Ste Allamon v. Mayor of Albany, 43 Barb. 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1864); See v. Partridge, 9 N.Y.
Super. Ct. Rep. (2 Duer) 463 (1853).
15. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 379. Current standard form contracts grant the CM damages for delays
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ciple that orderly access of each of several succeeding trade contractors to the site
requires coordination and that the party most aware of each contractor's sched-
uled commencement and completion dates and access needs-the owner-should
be the party responsible for coordination.
16
The owner remains liable for damages for delay in scheduling and coordina-
tion even today under the AIA, AGC, and GSA PBS standard form contracts, and
despite the presence of a CM.17 The AIA construction management contract is the
one most widely used in the industry.' It requires the CM to schedule and coordi-
nate the work of the prime contractors.1 9 However, the owner retains the right to
use prime contracts, the residual duty to coordinate the work of the primes if the
CM has not done so, and the power to stop any noncomplying work and complete
the contract himself.20 While the CM is held only to a due diligence standard in
the performance of his contract, the owner is ultimately responsible for
coordination. 2 1
Under the AGC construction management contract, the CM develops a
schedule, 22 coordinates contract documents (without assuming any responsibility
for design),23 and monitors and coordinates the contractors' work.24 If a trade
contractor's work is not adequate, the CM will recommend a course of action to
the owner, 25 but the CM has no sanction authority of his own. The power to
terminate a defaulting contractor remains with the owner. 26 The CM is thus only
an agent for the owner with respect to coordination and will probably not be held
liable for scheduling problems. The AGC contract does, however, provide for the
caused by owners. See Associated General Contractors, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owners and
Construction Managers (Guaranteed Maximum Price Option), Doc. 8, art. 6 (June 1977) [hereinafter cited
as AGC 1977 GMP Agreement], reprinted in BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE TO CONSTRUCTION 248 [hereinafter
cited as BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE].
16. See, e.g., Gasperini Excavating Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 409 Pa. 465, 187 A.2d 157
(1963).
17. Courts will even sometimes look closely at what the term "contractor" means to see if, in fact, this
party is nothing more than an agent for the owner. In Everette v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 614 P.2d
1341 (Alaska 1980), the pipeline company's defense against the claim of an injured worker was that it was a
contractor which had itself hired the subcontractors. The court, however, looked through the form to the
substance of the relationship, finding that Alyeska acted as an "integral part" of the oil companies and was
created by them for the sole purpose of coordinating the construction of the Alaskan pipeline. Id at 1346.
Alyeska's only job was to secure contracts of outsiders and supervise, not "to execute pipeline construc-
tion." ld
18. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction
Manager, Doc. B801 (1980). [hereinafter cited as AIA CM Agreement]; American Institute of Architects,
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager, Doc. B801 (1973), reprinted in
BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 15, at 238. See generally Sweet, The Architect Profession Responds to Construc-
tion Management and Design-Build The Spotlight on AlA Documents, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1983, at
69, at text accompanying nn.l-5.
19. AIA CM Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 1.2.2-1.2.2.3.
20. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Doc.
A201/CM, art. 6.1.3 (constr. management ed. June 1980).
21. Sneed, supra note 8, at 365.
22. AGC 1977 GMP Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2.1.2.
23. Id art. 2.1.4.
24. Id arts. 2.2.1-2.2.1.6.
25. Id art. 2.2.1.6.
26. Article 2.2.1.6 requires the CM to "[r]ecommend courses of action to the Owner when require-
ments of a Trade Contract are not being met." Id
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CM to guarantee a maximum price if desired by the owner. 27 When the CM
thereby assumes the entrepreneurial risk of the contract, he retains the authority to
enforce the work schedule and to coordinate the contractor's work. 28
Under the GSA PBS's construction management contract, the CM ensures
that the construction will be completed on or before the scheduled completion
date and as early as possible.29 He must also develop a comprehensive schedule for
the project. 30 However, the ultimate power to enforce the schedule remains with
the GSA's contracting officer. 31 Thus the CM is only an agent for the owner; the
owner holds the ultimate responsibility for scheduling and coordination. It is
notable that even the GSA PBS contract, which is written by an owner, provides
the same result as the AIA and AGC contracts: The owner is ultimately liable for
delays resulting from a breakdown in scheduling and coordination.
Pierce Associates v. United States32 illustrates that the courts of today also are
reluctant to relieve the owner of liability. In that case, a structural prime con-
tractor fell behind in the performance of his work. Despite receiving notification of
the problem from the CM, the GSA PBS's contracting officer did nothing for more
than five months. When sued by a mechanical prime who was delayed by the
structural prime, the GSA PBS asserted that the mutual responsibility clause in
each of the prime contracts required that the delayed contractor bring an action
directly against the delaying contractor. The court sidestepped this argument by
saying that regardless of whether the delayed prime had a cause of action directly
against the delaying prime, the action against the GSA PBS was proper because of
the agency's power to order a delaying contractor to increase shifts and workdays
and to work overtime. Thus, Pierce stands for the proposition that, despite the
inclusion of a mutual responsibility clause and many attempts by the CM to effect
compliance, the owner must take affirmative action in a timely manner. 33
Given the change in the nature of the owner today, however, the rationale
behind the nineteenth century cases and recent ones such as Pierce may no longer
be applicable to hold the owner to a nondelegable duty to coordinate. Today,
27. Id art. 6.
28. See Conner, Contractingfor Construction Management Services, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1983,
at 5, 13-16.
29. Public Building Service, General Service Administration Construction Management Contract
(rev. ed. Apr. 15, 1975), reprintedzin PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, THE
GSA SYSTEM FOR CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 23 (1977).
30. Id. art. 4, at 7-12.
31. Id. art. 14, at 19; Sneed, supra note 8, at 359-60.
32. 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,746 (1977).
33. While continuing to impose liability on the GSA as owner, the courts have not established the
standards of conduct governing the duty to coordinate. The duty has been characterized as an obligation
"to prevent interference with orderly and reasonable progress of a contractor's work by other contractors
over whom the Government has control." L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 559, 564 (Ct.
Cl. 1969). Another court has required "reasonable efforts." Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162,
170 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Nevertheless, authorities are split concerning whether an owner is required to terminate
a defaulting contractor after all other steps have been taken, albeit unsuccessfully. Compare id at 171 with
Norelli & Oliver Constr. Co. v. State, 30 A.D.2d 992, 294 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1968), affd, 32 N.Y.2d 809, 289
N.E.2d 691, 345 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1973). Termination is an extreme remedy which the owner would prefer to
avoid, since it may expose him to liability for delay damages to other contractors during the time it takes to
identify and mobilize a successor.
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when complicated scheduling (often taking the form of the critical path method) is
demanded, the tasks formerly undertaken by the owner are now performed by a
specialist. Most often, the CM is this specialist.
When the first coordination cases described the duty as belonging to the owner,
they were in fact ignoring the issue of fault and instead allocating the risk to the
party who had the superior knowledge and control. 34 Such a result also seemed
equitable because it was the owner who had created the situation with its potential
difficulties. 35 Today, however, it is the CM who possesses both the superior knowl-
edge and the ability to eliminate timing and site-access problems and to derive
solutions for such problems through coordination; the owner, particularly the non-
professional owner, clearly plays a background role. It follows that the rationale
used by those early courts to hold the owner responsible for coordination can be
applied today to impose on the CM, not the owner, the responsibility for
coordination.
B. Statutory Barriers36
For the public nonprofessional owner, state statutes governing the award of
contracts may present additional bars to reallocating the risk of construction in
two ways. 37 First, the statutes may preclude the nonprofessional owner from dele-
gating the duty to coordinate. Second, the desirability of using construction man-
agement may be lessened when a public contract must be awarded to the lowest
bidder.
The public bidding statutes governing the State of New York and its munici-
palities have been interpreted to forbid delegation of the duty to coordinate.
Those statutes require that for construction projects of more than $50,000, sepa-
rate contracts must be awarded for various trades or segments of the work. 38 A
provision of a contract requiring the contractor for general construction to submit
34. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 382. See generally 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1340 (1962);
18 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1932, at 12 (3d ed. 1978).
35. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 382.
36. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the states. Rather, its purpose is to
highlight particular statutes which illustrate the relevant problems.
37. State licensing provisions may reduce the effectiveness of a CM even for private owners. For
example, North Carolina defines "any person or firm or corporation who.., undertakes to superintend or
manage . . . the construction of any building . . . where the cost . . . is thirty thousand dollars ($30,000)
or more" to be a "general contractor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-1 (Supp. 1981). When an unlicensed party
enters into such a contract, he cannot sue for breach or recover on a quasi-contractual theory. Bryan
Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 270, 273, 162 S.E.2d 507, 511, 512-13 (1968); Revis Sand &
Stone v. King, 49 N.C. App. 168, 171, 270 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1980).
While a misdemeanor penalty is also imposed on the unlicensed contractor, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-13
(1981), this party's loss of ability to enforce contracts has more serious implications for the construction
process. When the owner does not contract directly with the primes, an unlicensed CM's inability to sue
has the potential to wreak havoc with completion of and proper payment for work.
38. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1977) states in relevant part:
1. Every officer, board or agency of a political subdivision or of any district therein, charged with the
duty of preparing specifications or awarding or entering into contracts for the erection, construction,
reconstruction or alteration of buildings, when the entire cost of such work shall exceed fifty thousand
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a work progress schedule was found to violate the statute. 39 The court reasoned
that in requiring a contractor to prepare a work schedule, the state shifted its duty
of coordination without specific legislative authority to do so. 40 The New York
courts have, however, recognized that compelling the government body to enter
into separate contracts while forcing that body to retain the duty of coordination is
extremely inefficient:
The Court would like to observe that Section 135 of the State Finance Law, and any
other statutory requirement, should be studied with the express purpose of either elimi-
nating or amending the law to permit the State to let such contracts as this one to one
bidder, instead of five, six, or more bidders, with none having authority over the others but
all having the same privilege of screaming for help from the State Engineer on the job,
whose own efficiency is diluted because too often he has to "mother" the disputing contrac-
tors, rather than perform his primary duty of progressing the job. Experience would indi-
cate that under the prevailing system the State squanders huge sums of money in trying to
keep the jigsaw puzzle together, whereas, under the one bid system, the responsibility of
efficiency and coordination would not only be upon the one contractor but it would be to
said contractor's financial advantage to move with coordination, efficiency and due speed
to complete the contract, for the basic reason that the contractor could not place upon the
shoulders of others, but only upon himself, any blame for a slowdown or uncoordinated
work.4"
While this court recommended returning to the single-bid system, permitting
the state to delegate the coordination duty to a CM could likewise resolve the
inefficiencies. The CM would have the authority to direct the work of contractors.
dollars, shall prepare separate specifications for the following three subdivisions of the work to be
performed:
a. Plumbing and gas fitting;
b. Steam heating, hot water heating, ventilating and air conditioning apparatus; and
c. Electric wiring and standard illuminating fixtures.
2. Such specifications shall be drawn so as to permit separate and independent bidding upon each of
the above three subdivisions of work. All contracts awarded by any political subdivision or by any
officer, board or agency thereof, or of any district therein, for the erection, construction, reconstruction
or alteration of buildings, or any part thereof, shall award the three subdivisions of the above specified
work separately in the manner provided by section one hundred three of this chapter. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to prevent any political subdivision from performing any such branches of
work by or through their regular employees, or in the case of public institutions, by the inmates
thereof.
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 135 (McKinney 1974) governs all state contracts and is similarly worded.
39. General Bldg. Contractors v. County of Oneida, 54 Misc. 2d 260, 282 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct.
1967); accord General Bldg. Contractors v. City of Syracuse, 40 A.D.2d 584, 334 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1972),
modified, 32 N.Y.2d 780, 298 N.E.2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1973).
40. General Bldg. Contractors v. County of Oneida, 54 Misc. 2d at 260, 282 N.Y.S.2d 385, 388. The
court relied in part on the fact that the legislature had expressly authorized shifting the duty to coordinate
in the public authorities statute, which reads:
Construction contracts. . . let by the corporation shall be in conformity with the applicable provisions
of section one hundred thirty-five of the state finance law, but the corporation in its discretion may
assign such contracts for supervision and coordination to the successful bidder for any subdivision of
work for which the corporation receives bids.
N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1287(1) (McKinney 1982). That provision has been construed to allow broad
delegation of coordination responsibility for a complete project. See KEC Corp. v. New York State Envtl.
Facilities Corp., 76 Misc. 2d 170, 350 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
Comparison of the state and municipality statutes with the public authorities statute indicates that
New York courts have good reason not to imply a right to delegate the duty to coordinate. Reform must
therefore come from the legislature, not from the courts.
41. Forest Elec. Corp. v. State, 52 Misc. 2d 215, 217-18, 275 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919-20 (Ct. Cl. 1966),affd,
30 A.D.2d 905, 292 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1968).
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Since the CM would bear the legal liability resulting from delays in the project, it
would also be to his financial advantage to move with "due speed."
Public bidding statutes may work a second inefficiency by requiring that the
CM contract be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Such nebulous quali-
fiers as "responsible" give little room for considering quality. The award of the
CM contract is, however, perhaps the most essential award; the CM himself signif-
icantly affects both the quality of the work and the time needed for completion.
Without a more rigorous procedure to examine the expertise of bidders seeking the
CM position, the CM may well become the lowest common denominator in the
construction process. 42 The overall quality of work can be no better than the qual-
ity of the CM's performance. When this possibility exists, the owner's ability to
achieve the objectives of quality and timely completion may outweigh his desire to
shift some of the risks.
III
A NEW APPROACH: CONTRACTUAL ALLOCATION OF RISK TO CM
A. Edwinj DobsonJr., Inc. v. Rutgers.- Recognition of the Owner's Successful
Delegation of the Duty to Coordinate
In the midst of the courts' reluctance to release the owner from liability for
scheduling and coordinating work, Edwinj. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers43 is the sole
example of an owner's successful delegation of the duty of coordination to a CM. 44
As seen above, courts rarely look beyond contractual terms to analyze the true
relationships among the parties in a construction contract and the expectations
those parties bring into the transaction. However, the Dobson court's interpreta-
tion of a typical construction management arrangement allowed the owner to
42. South Carolina has designed a procedure which overcomes the restraints of the lowest bidder
requirement. The CM, as well as the architect/engineer and land surveyor, are chosen by the building
agency's selection committee comprised of persons who are "qualified to make an informed decision as to
the most competent and qualified firm for the proposed project." S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-3220(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1982). The committee issues invitations to firms to submit information. The invitation
includes a description of professional services needed as well as a description of the work. Id. § 11-35-
3220(2). Once the committee receives the information, it selects at least five firms for interviews. Id. § 11-
35-3220(4). After interviews, the firms are ranked in order of qualification on the basis of "(a) past per-
formance; (b) the ability of professional personnel; (c) willingness to meet time and budget requirements;
(d) location; (e) recent, current and projected work loads of the firms; and (I) related experience on similar
projects." Id. § 11-35-3220(5). Contract negotiations are commenced beginning with the highest-ranked
firm. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached, the state has the prerogative to terminate negotiations
and contact the next-highest-ranked interviewee. Id. § 11-35-3220(7).
This system helps to ensure that the CM has the expertise needed while still providing the safeguards
essential for any state contract.
43. 157 N.J. Super. 357, 384 A.2d 1121 (Law Div. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Broadway Maintenance Corp.
v. Rutgers, 180 N.J. Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 (App. Div. 1981).
44. In John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 500 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich.
1980), the court found an action against a CM for negligent performance of scheduling and coordination
to be barred by the "no damage for delay clause" in the contract between the owner and contractor.
However, since the court never addressed whether the CM or the owner had the power to enforce a
schedule, it never really reached the question of who, between the owner and CM, had ultimate responsi-
bility. The court did allow a cause of action against the CM for intentional interference with contractual
relations.
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delegate all coordination duties. This interpretation may be some indication of
how such cases will be analyzed in the future.
The facts of this case are fairly complex. In building a new medical school,
Rutgers entered into six prime contracts, including one with Frank Briscoe Co.,
Inc., (Briscoe) for general construction, one with Edwin J. Dobson, Jr., Inc.,
(Dobson) for plumbing and fire prevention, and one with Broadway Maintenance
Corp. (Broadway) for electrical work. Briscoe's role in the project was essentially
that of a CM, although it was not specifically referred to as such. Briscoe was to be
the "supervisor, manager, overseer, coordinator and expediter of all of the Con-
tractors and of the total construction process and all of its parts. ' ' 45 Rutgers in
turn "relie[d] upon the organization, management, skill, cooperation, and effi-
ciency of [Briscoe] to supervise, direct, control and manage the General Construc-
tion work and the efforts of the other Contractors, so as to deliver the intended
building conforming to the Contract and within the scheduled time."'46 The other
contractors also agreed to rely on the control and management of Briscoe for com-
pletion of the project on time.47
Rutgers employed a critical path method (CPM) consultant to devise a dia-
gram and schedule for the most efficient plan for completing the project. Briscoe
was to "incorporate and enforce the combined schedule as his own."'48 Each of the
other contractors agreed "to cooperate and coordinate his own operations in order
to meet effectively all scheduled task deadlines."'49 The CPM-estimated time for
completion of 700 days was included in all the contracts. Dobson's work was com-
pleted twenty-five months after the estimated completion date, and Broadway's
performance took twenty-nine months more than estimated.
Briscoe, Dobson, and Broadway filed suit against Rutgers for failure to coordi-
nate and supervise the construction work. The State of New Jersey, which had
assumed all contracts, defended primarily on the ground that the duty for coordi-
nation lay with Briscoe under the terms of the contract. Before the consolidated
cases came to trial, Briscoe settled its major claims with the state.50 The trial court
held that the owner had in fact delegated the duty to coordinate to Briscoe and
that Briscoe had the necessary means to enforce its responsibility by bringing suit
against a delaying contractor on either a direct contract theory or a third party
beneficiary theory. 5' The appeals court likewise held that the contract language
gave the duty to coordinate to Briscoe, but found that Briscoe could bring an
enforcement suit only on a third party beneficiary theory. 52
1. Direct Contract Cause of Action. The plaintiffs' claim that Rutgers had an
45. Dobson, 157 N.J. Super. at 367, 384 A.2d at 1125.
46. Id. at 367, 384 A.2d at 1126.
47. Id
48. Id. at 368 n.4, 384 A.2d at 1126 n.4.
49. Id
50. The state retained some counterclaims against Briscoe for indemnification for the claims of
Dobson and Broadway, as provided in the contract. See contract provision G4-D.2 printed at id. at 374,
384 A.2d at 1129.
51. Id at 411, 384 A.2d at 1149.
52. Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 180 N.J. Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 (App. Div. 1981).
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implied duty to coordinate the project was based on two premises: (1) that the
plaintiffs had privity only with Rutgers and (2) that Rutgers had practical control
over the project since it was the only party who could withhold funds or terminate
a contractor.5 3 The court, however, focused on the contract language which speci-
fied that Briscoe would coordinate all construction and that all other contractors
would rely on his management of the work. 54 Since the same language was a part
of the general conditions of each contract, these provisions were binding on
Dobson and Broadway despite their lack of privity with Briscoe, 55 thus giving rise
to a breachable duty on which any contracting party could sue.
A second basis for a direct contract action was the agreement of all parties to
coordinate the scheduling of their work.56 By the terms of the general conditions,
all the contractors agreed to follow the CPM schedule and cooperate with Briscoe's
enforcement of the schedule. 57 To enable the CPM to develop a workable
schedule, all the contractors had to furnish certain information to the consultant.
The court found that in furnishing such information the contractors "essentially
agreed with one another that the work would be performed in that manner,
sequence, and time. ' '58 Moreover, Rutgers could not be liable for delays resulting
from the scheduling arrangements because it was not a party to the development
of the schedule; it had specified neither the manner nor sequence of performance
and had had no input into the process.5 9 The scheduling process thus gave rise to
a contract right only among those involved in its development, i.e., the prime
contractors.
60
2. T"hird Party Beneficiary Cause of Acton. The trial court also found that since
Briscoe was a third party beneficiary to the plaintiffs' contracts with Rutgers, its
ability to sue on that theory was an alternative effective means of enforcing its
duty to coordinate. 61 This cause of action was viewed as devolving from a provi-
sion in the general conditions requiring any contractor who caused an unnecessary
delay to pay all costs and expenses incurred by other parties as a result of that
53. For cases implying an owner's duty to coordinate, see Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162
(Ct. Cl. 1968); L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 559 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Peter C. Camilli & Sons
v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 218, 245 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
55. Dobson, 157 N.J. Super. at 410, 384 A.2d at 1148. Broadway had argued this point, perhaps too
convincingly, in contending that another provision of the general conditions was binding on all parties. See
i. at 399, 384 A.2d at 1142-43.
56. The court never articulated whether these were independent bases giving rise to separate causes of
action, or whether the combined force of both was the grounds for recovery. See Sneed, supra note 8, at
370.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
58. Dobson, 157 N.J. Super. at 404, 384 A.2d at 1145.
59. Should the owner interfere with or abandon the CPM schedule, however, he becomes liable for
resulting delays. See Natkin & Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 347 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
60. On appeal, the court recognized a cause of action arising from only a third party beneficiary
theory, not from a contractual basis. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Such reasoning is consis-
tent with the proposition that the duty to coordinate is as strong as the power to enforce the orders. See
Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162, 169-70 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Otherwise, the power to enforce the
duty would be equivalent to the power to write certain provisions into the contract.
61. Dobson, 157 N.J. Super. at 407, 384 A.2d at 1146.
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delay.62 Applying traditional third party beneficiary theory, the court focused
upon the persons to whom performance was to be rendered in determining
whether the intent to benefit was present; if performance was to be directly ren-
dered to the third party, that party was intended to benefit and could enforce the
contract. Otherwise, the party was an incidental beneficiary who could not
enforce the contract. 63
Since the contractors had agreed not to make claims against the owner for
damages, the court reasoned that the contractors intended to relieve the owner of
liability and to look instead to the delaying contractor for damages. 64 Because the
performance of each contractor's promise to pay for delay was to be rendered
directly to the other contractors, each contractor was found to have intended to
benefit the other primes, giving rise to a cause of action to every other prime.
Thus, Briscoe was a third party beneficiary of Broadway's and Dobson's promises
to pay damages for unnecessary delays.
Although the appeals court also focused on the intent of the contracting par-
ties, it relied on the contract language requiring coordination of work with other
contractors to find such an intent to benefit each other. Given the direct benefit
each contractor would receive from the performance of other primes, the court
concluded that the parties intended Broadway and Dobson to be beneficiaries of
the Briscoe-Rutgers contract. They could therefore sue Briscoe for failure to coor-
dinate the work.6 5
62. Id. at 408, 384 A.2d at 1147.
63. Id at 410, 384 A.2d at 1148; see L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 117 (2d ed. 1965). An exception to
this generalization is noted at RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 comment d (1932).
64. Dobson, 157 N.J. Super. at 408-09, 384 A.2d at 1147.
65. Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 180 N.J. Super. 350, 357-58, 434 A.2d 1125, 1129 (App.
Div. 1981). The appeals court never stated whether it was necessary for Briscoe to have some means of
enforcement to assume the duty of coordination. Since the court analyzed the right to sue from the view-
point of Broadway and Dobson suing Briscoe, the opinion could be read as requiring a third party benefi-
ciary theory only as a means of recovering damages for delay from the CM, not as being an essential
element of the duty to coordinate.
The courts' recognition of a third party beneficiary cause of action represents a growing awareness that
"the interrelationships, interdependency and reliance upon the promises and performances of others which
pervade the construction field necessitate rules which are more responsive to the needs of the industry."
Comment, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parttes in the Construction Industry, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 315, 322-23
(1971). Given the close relationships existing in the construction field, allowing third party beneficiary
actions is inherently sensible. When a contract creates a benefit which is to be conferred on a third party,
that party has a reasonable expectation of receiving that benefit and frequently justifiably changes his
position in reliance on that expectation. Id. at 322;see also A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 775 (one-
vol. ed. 1952). When that third party is injured, allowing him to directly litigate his claim without mul-
tiple and circuitous suits certainly seems preferable. Since the gravamen of the cause of action arises from
the interdependent relationship of participants in the industry, no contractor is exposed to suits from par-
ties uncontemplated in the original contract. Comment, supra, at 323-26.
The greatest bar to finding a third party beneficiary relationship has been the difficulty in applying the
"intent-to-benefit" test. In the absence of an express statement of intent to benefit another contractor, the
courts usually find the third party to be only an incidental beneficiary. A. CORBIN, supra, § 779D: see
Comment, supra, at 320-21. Some notable exceptions to this general rule are Flinkote Co. v. Brewer Co.,
221 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Thomas G. Snavely Co. v. Brown Constr. Co., 45 Ohio 2d 41,
239 N.E.2d 759 (C.P. 1968); County of Giles v. First U.S. Corp., 223 Tenn. 245, 445 S.W.2d 157 (1969). In
litigation involving suits between coprime contractors, however, there is a growing acceptance of coprimes
as intended beneficiaries of the contracts between the other primes and the owner. In the leading case of
M.T. Reed Constr. Co. v. Virginia Metal Prods., 213 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1954), the three primes' contracts
all included agreements to coordinate their work and cooperate to ensure timely completion. Each con-
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3. Means of Enforcement. In approving causes of action against other primes as a
means for Briscoe to enforce its duty to coordinate, the trial court in Dobson appar-
ently accepted the premise that the duty to coordinate is only as effective as the
means to compel compliance. 66 The court declined, however, to accept the correl-
ative premise that the ability to impose sanctions on a contractor is equivalent to
the duty to coordinate.6 7 For example, the trial court refused to imply a duty to
coordinate from Rutgers' power to withhold money or to terminate a defaulting
contractor. To imply such a duty in Rutgers would have defeated the basic pur-
pose of entering into the contract with Briscoe: to delegate the responsibility for
the everyday coordination of the work's progress and thereby to avoid any
resulting liability for failure to achieve the desired goal. 68
The court stated that the "effective means of enforcing the contract is not the
ability to withhold funds or to terminate, but to sue and to enforce according to
the remedies provided by law."'69 In the very next sentence, however, the court
recognized the shortcoming of this remedy: "Fortunately, most contractors honor
their commitments or the courts would be overwhelmed. ' 7 ) The contractor who is
injured by the delay of another contractor will be benefited little if the construc-
tractor also agreed to pay the cost of any defective work, and in a mutual responsibility clause, each
contractor agreed to pay for any damage which he caused another contractor. The court found that the
"mutual obligation" to coordinate their work was essential to completion of the job and was in fact a part
of the consideration which "induced each of the contractors to undertake its particular job at the agreed
price." Id. at 338.
While the Broadway court stressed the above portion of the Reed opinion, the Reed court actually sug-
gested that it was the duty to pay for damages which created the cause of action.
(T]he contract in suit made the several contractors direct beneficiaries of the contractual provision
that any contractor would be liable for any actual damages inflicted upon another contractor on this
job because of the breach of any duty assumed under the contract by the contractor. When to this
there was added the contractual obligation, upon due notice, to settle with such contractor by agree-
ment or arbitration for the damage caused, the local law created the right of action or caused it to
arise out of the facts.
Id at 339.
Thus, wherever a coprime contractor has agreed to coordinate his work with that of other primes
and/or to pay damages to the other primes caused by his delay, the courts will apparently be willing to
recognize the third party prime's right to sue under the contract. See also J. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred
Lindgren, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (court found "reciprocal relationship" giving rise to
cause of action); KEC Corp. v. New York State Envtl. Facilities Corp., 76 Misc. 2d 170, 350 N.Y.S.2d 331
(Sup. Ct. 1973) (promises to indemnify owner and reimburse other parties for damages created cause of
action); Visintine & Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959); T&R
Duncanson v. The Scottish County Investment Co., 1915 Sess. Cas. 1106 (Scot. SheriffCt.) (dicta). Contra
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (despite coordination and
mutual responsibility clauses, coprimes not entitled to cause of action because the intent to benefit was not
clearly expressed in the contract language and the coprimes did not have the exclusive interest in the CM's
performance).
66. See, e.g., Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 162, 169-70 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
67. See Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton v. New York State Thruway Auth., 27 Misc. 2d 522, 212
N.Y.S.2d 263 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (engineer had contractual duty to coordinate and supervise, but owner held
liable to engineer for delays caused by prime contractor because the owner possessed the sanctions), modi-
fled, 18 A.D.2d 402, 239 N.Y.S.2d 732 (owner held not liable for delay damages because engineer failed to
meet high burden of proof that "no possible exercise of reasonable judgment or fair dealing . . . would
have excused" the owner from exercising its sanctions), aJ'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1091, 196 N.E.2d 64, 246 N.Y.S.2d
409 (1963).
68. Dobson, 157 N.J.. Super. at 405, 384 A.2d at 1145-46.
69. Id. at 407, 384 A.2d at 1146.
70. Id.
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tion manager's only method of enforcement is to sue and get a judgment after the
job is completed.7'
In the Dobson case, final disposition came ten years after construction was com-
pleted. In addition to the obvious risk of bankruptcy of the delaying contractor in
such a lengthy period, the injured contractor will certainly not be compensated for
its loss when the need for damages is likely to be greatest, that is, immediately after
the injury. Realistically, the CM's sanctions are reduced to recovering damages;
there will be no real immediate action which can be taken (other than mere threat
of suit) to compel timely performance of the job.
In contrast, the owner's retained powers to withhold money or terminate a
defaulting contractor provide a much more effective remedy against the recalci-
trant contractor. The owner, however, is faced with a dilemma in determining
how many of his sanctions to transfer to the CM. Delegating the power to with-
hold money or terminate a contractor would make clear where the duty to coordi-
nate lies as well as providing an effective enforcement tool to the CM. In such a
delegation, however, the owner risks losing all ability short of suit to effectively
protect his own interests.7 2
B. An Alternative Approach
The Dobson court's recognition that the owner may delegate his responsibility
despite retaining power is consonant with the view that the duty to coordinate is
broader than the sanctions available to a party.
The emphasis on sanctions . . . masks the fact that some coordination duties may exist
independently of the sanction powers. For example, if the owner is supposed. to resolve
conflicts between contractors, he may be called upon to do so even when the contractors are
performing properly and thus sanctions are not warranted. Coordination, then, is essen-
tially a job management function. It depends not so much on the ability to impose sanc-
tions as on the ability to apply contractual pressure. . . .IT]he power to impose sanctions
as such is not required as an element of the duty to coordinate. That duty exists even where
there is no such power. What is required is the contractual ability to influence the
contractors.73
71. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 390. Moreover, any successful suit by the CM against the delaying
contractor that would make the CM another obligee of the contractor's performance bond would certainly
dilute the amount of the bond. It would decrease the value of the bond to the owner because, upon
default, the contractor would only be able to pay the owner what he has not already paid to the CM. Such
a threat to the owner's security might cause an immediate halt to construction and thus would not be the
most efficient means by which a CM could enforce his coordination responsibilities.
72. Id. at 400.
73. Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted). In two cases, courts have found certain contract language strong
enough to require the owner to coordinate the progress of the work, without any reference to the sanctions
available to the owner. In Hoffman v. United States, 340 F.2d 645 (Ct. Cl. 1964), and Shea-S&M Ball v.
Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the owners were found to have duties to invoke
their contractual authority to compel cooperation among the contractors. The contract in Hoffman pro-
vided that "[t]he State shall conduct operations so as to cooperate fully with any such work being per-
formed by the Government and/or Goverrment contractors and shall carefully fit its own work to that
provided under other contracts as directed by the Contracting Officer." 340 F.2d at 649 (emphasis deleted).
The Shea-S&M Ball contract provided that the owner could "undertake or award other contracts for addi-
tional work, and the Contractor shall fully cooperate with such other Contractors and [the owner's]
employees and carefully fit his own work to such additional work as may be directed by the Contracting
Officer." 606 F.2d at 1250. In each case, the owner's failure to invoke its contractual rights to require
cooperation was found to be the basis for liability. While the courts never reached a determination of what
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Thus, the duty to coordinate arises not from the owner's status as owner nor from
his power as keeper of the purse but from his position as the overall manager of the
construction and as the party with the greatest contractual influence.
The nonprofessional owner, however, does not possess the expertise needed to
adequately supervise the construction and exercise his sanctions in the most effec-
tive manner. When the duty is viewed as arising from the bases of managerial
function and contractual influence, the owner should be free to delegate his power
to the party with the expertise to wield the power effectively-the CM. In trans-
ferring the managerial functions to the CM, the owner may establish stronger con-
tractual influence between the CM and other prime contractors. At the same
time, the owner may retain some separate sanctions to protect his own interests.
Under its Dobson contract, Briscoe certainly had the contractual authority to
compel cooperation among the contractors. The contract made clear that all par-
ties were relying on Briscoe for coordination of the work.7 4 Furthermore, Briscoe
was to enforce the schedule, and the other contractors promised to cooperate with
him. 75 Such leverage given to the CM in the contract should be deemed sufficient
to delegate to the CM the duty to coordinate, independent of enforcement sanc-
tions available to the CM or to the owner.
An owner might specifically include in each party's contract a description of its
responsibilities and for whose benefit they are intended. The owner may protect
his interests by reserving the right to hold back retainage sufficient to protect him
from defective work. Since no owner would relinquish such a right, retaining that
sanction is unlikely to be interpreted as retaining the duty to coordinate. How-
ever, various other factors may intervene to support a holding that the owner
reserves the duty to coordinate. If the CM's directives are ignored by other con-
tractors so that the owner intervenes to support the CM, the owner's claim of total
delegation of duty may not be accepted. It is possible that the owner could be
liable for negligence in selecting the CM, despite a contractual disclaimer of lia-
bility. Finally, the owner will be liable if he in fact assumes the actual coordina-
tion responsibilities, despite contractual language to the contrary.
76
One untested alternative would be for the contract to provide first that the
owner will exercise his supervisory powers for his benefit alone and not for the
contractors' benefit. A second clause would absolve him from liability if he exer-
cises these powers. With these two clauses, the owner would have the power to
coordinate the job to the extent necessary and yet incur no liability whether or not
he exercises his power. The contract terms themselves would exclude the possi-
bility that any contractor could reasonably rely on the owner to coordinate.
must be done to meet this duty, in both cases the arrangement of an unsuccessful conference between
contractors was deemed insufficient.
No reference was made to any sanctions which could be imposed to encourage contractors to cooperate.
However, since the contracts required that the owners coordinate the work, they had duties to exercise that
contractual authority.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
75. See supra text accompanying note 47.
76. See Natkin & Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 347 F. Supp. 17, 36 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
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IV
MEANS OF SHARING RISK IN A CONSTRUCTION JOB
Many mechanisms have been developed for shifting risk of loss among partici-
pants in complex enterprises. A rule of policy has emerged over the years which
sanctions deliberate allocation of risk. For example, an employer is vicariously
liable for the torts of his employee. Such negligence is, as a practical matter, cer-
tain to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise. The risk of such liability
is in reality placed upon the entire enterprise as a required cost of doing business.
The employer is able to distribute the losses throughout society, by means of lia-
bility insurance premiums and price increases.
Construction is a field in which the attendant risks are as serious and numerous
as those facing a large employer. At first glance, the nonprofessional owner seems
to be well shielded through payment and performance bonds required of contrac-
tors and subcontractors and through errors and omissions insurance carried by
design professionals. Nevertheless, many gaps exist whereby the owner is not cov-
ered by any of these devices. Moreover, with the introduction of the CM as
another actor, the risk of liability increases for both the CM and the owner. Inevi-
tably, those claims which are brought against the CM will be brought against his
"employer," the owner.
This section first discusses the various gaps in the protections available to the
owner. Second, it discusses the resultant allocation or reallocation of the risk of
negligent and nonnegligent error in the progress and construction of the project.
A. Owner's Exposure to Liability and Devices Which Purport to Limit It
1. Payment and Performance Bonds. Owners are generally protected from a con-
tractor's bankruptcy and subsequent inability to finish a job by a contractual pro-
vision requiring a performance bond.77 Under such a bond, a surety promises
either to step in and complete the contractor's job or to pay the owner's contract
price and allow him to retain the defaulting contractor or hire a new one. Pay-
ment bonds on the other hand protect the owner from the liens of materialmen
and laborers while protecting the rights of these suppliers and employees to be
compensated. When the federal government is the owner, the Miller Act 78 pro-
vides for payment to materialmen and laborers.7 9 State governments have their
own counterparts of the Miller Act, and the obligations assumed by bond or
imposed by statute vary greatly.80
77. When the contract contemplates the owner's making direct payments to trade contractors, how-
ever, the necessity for a payment bond from the general contractor is obviated.
78. Ch. 642, 49 Stat. 793 (1935) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 270 (1976 & Supp. 1981)).
79. Statutory provisions extending this [Miller Act] bond protection to private work have been held
to be constitutional. Such bonds are now required by statute in California, Florida, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Utah, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. There is no pattern of uniformity with respect
thereto. Such legislation may either supplement the supplier's right to a mechanic's lien or provide
that the right under the bond shall be in substitution for the right under the mechanic's lien statute.
E. Cushman, R. Cushman & K. Cushman, Bonds on Pub/ic Works, in CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL
LAWS 769, 773 (Nat'l Assoc. Credit Man. ed. 1981).
80. See E. Cushman, R. Cushman & K. Cushman, Slate Bond Laws, in CREDIT MANUAL OF COIMMER-
CIAL LAWs 792 (Nat'l Assoc. Credit. Man. ed. 1981), for a discussion of a Miller Act state counterpart in
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The owner may not be as well protected as he believes, however. In many
instances, the liability of the surety to the owner under a performance bond may
not be coextensive with the liability of the contractor. Either the surety or the
contractor may have valid defenses against the owner's claim. For example, the
owner must not release any retainage or pay the contractor a greater percentage of
the contract price than was actually earned.8 1 This arrangement is designed to
guarantee that the surety has a sufficient balance to complete the job or satisfy
unpaid bills of the contractor. When the owner pays more than the contractor is
entitled to, the surety is discharged. Discharge of the surety also occurs if the
owner accepts work which does not substantially conform to the contract terms.
82
The surety may be discharged if the owner requests a substantial and material
alteration in the underlying contract which materially changes the surety's risk,
without obtaining the surety's consent to the change.8 3 Some states do not even
require that the surety be prejudiced by the material alteration,8 4 making the
owner's risk of liability particularly high if he changes the contract substantially.
The owner may thus inadvertently lose the protection of the surety's full perform-
ance or payment.8 5
Similarly, the obligation of the surety and contractor may not be coextensive
where the contractor specifically agrees to indemnify the owner for the contractor's
negligent acts. In this situation, the contract generally requires that the contractor
obtain liability insurance. If the contractor does not obtain this insurance, the
owner's acquiescence in the commencement of work may operate as an estoppel
when the owner seeks an enforcement upon the surety of the indemnification pro-
vision of the contract. 8 6
Furthermore, unless the surety promptly chooses between his options upon
default of the contractor, the value of the bond to the owner may be considerably
diminished.8 7 For example, the owner may lose the bond's protection if, upon the
each of the fifty states. The amount to be bonded varies widely from state to state, with some requiring
that it be 100% of the contract price (Delaware), some requiring that it not be less than one-half the
contract price (Colorado), and some making no special requirements (Florida-except for highway
contracts).
81. Sureties have been successful in asserting the defense of overpayment due to the relative ease with
which proof of prejudice can be established. Carnaghan, Deviations in Re-lei Contracts, Pro Tanto Dscharge of
Surety to Extent Prejudicial, 10 FORUM 63, 72 (1974).
82. See Murphy v. State ex re. Jackson School Township, 90 Ind. App. 432, 168 N.E. 875 (1929). For
exceptions which may preclude the contractor and his surety from asserting the owner's acceptance of the
work and subsequent release of monies as a defense, see Annot., 109 ALR 625, 628-30 (1937).
83. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 128 (1941). If the bond is a payment bond rather than a perform-
ance bond, the surety will not likely be able to plead change in the principal contract as a defense to labor
and material claims. For a full explanation, see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Borden Metal Prods.
Co., 539 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
84. See, e.g., Verduga Highlands, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 527, 49 Cal. Rptr. 736
(1966); CAL. CI. CODE § 2819 (West 1974).
85. Verduga Highlands, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 527, 533, 535, 49 Cal. Rptr. 736,
740, 742 (1966).
86. But see Safeway Stores v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 99, 20 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1962).
87. Moreover, some owners initially require that a contractor obtain a bond but, if he is successful,
waive it in order to save the cost of the premium, on the theory that if a responsible surety company will
bond the contractor he really does not need one. The problem is that sureties, too, make mistakes. From
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default of the contractor, the surety chooses to complete at its expense rather than
paying the owner the contract price. There may be so much delay from the
surety's "shopping" for a new contractor that the presumed advantage of having a
bond evaporates.
Nonprofessional owners also suffer when courts erode the distinctions between
performance and payment bonds. There are often attempts by laborers and mate-
rialmen, absent a true third party beneficiary payment bond, to convert by court
decision a true performance and indemnity bond into an express or implied third
party beneficiary obligation. A certain judicial "paternalism" is exercised by
courts in favor of laborers, subcontractors, and materialmen in these instances.
Courts overlook the fact that the owner is principally interested in completing the
project for the contract price and keeping it free from liens. Courts should not so
easily presume that the owner intended laborers and materialmen to have third
party beneficiary rights under the performance bond.88 Nevertheless, many state
courts find that third party beneficiary rights may be conferred by "implied"
intent where they are not expressly excluded by the contract or bond and where it
appears that the materialmen will not otherwise be paid.8 9
What are the implications for the owner and the surety when courts find, as in
the Dobson case, that one prime is liable to another prime for delay based on a
third party beneficiary doctrine, particularly when the defaulting prime has
assumed some obligation for coordination or scheduling?90 Can the contractor
who is damaged take advantage of the defaulting contractor's performance bond?
Fortunately for the surety (and the owner) it is merely a guarantor rather than a
performer. The surety's guarantee usually runs solely to the named obligees,
unless the bond's language shows a contrary intent. 9' Thus the delayed con-
the point of view of the owner, it is ironic that contractors from whom the owner least needs to require
bonds (due to their character, capacity and capital) are the only ones most sureties will consider bonding.
Further, some sureties condition their obligations to "performance of the work" and do not incorporate the
terms of the construction contracts. Under this kind of bond, the surety may limit its obligation to the
narrow guarantee that the work will be performed, leaving the owner responsible for unpaid bills incurred
by the contractor before his default and for the damages suffered by the owner as a result of late
completion.
88. When the owner on a public construction job requires the general contractor to carry a payment
bond, it is strong evidence of an intent to benefit subcontractors and materialmen because a mechanic's
lien may not be filed against public property. But if the owner is a private one, it is less clear that the
intent of the parties in requiring the bond is equally for the benefit of the third party laborers and materi-
almen. After all, it is the owner who is protected from having to pay the claims that the general contrac-
tors should have paid. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 264, 125 So. 55, 56-57 (1929).
89. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Alexander Indus., 58 Del. 548, 211 A.2d 919 (1965); Amelco
Window Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 342, 317 A.2d 398 (App. Div. 1974). Such attempts
against the federal government as owner, under a Miller Act performance bond, have been unsuccessful,
however. See, e.g., James E. Simon Co. v. United States ex rel. Ardelt-Horn Constr. Co., 316 F. Supp. 254
(D. Neb. 1970), afd, 446 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1060 (1972); Sun Ins. Co. v.
Diversified Eng'rs, 240 F. Supp. 606 (D. Mont. 1965).
90. If the obligee-owner were subject to a judgment by a prime contractor for delay damages, could
the owner assert the judgment obtained, against the defaulting prime, for failure to perform its contract?
And does this create a right to indemnity against the prime's (principal's) surety under the performance
bond? There is little if any case law on this line of reasoning.
91. There are no rights to sue on a private works performance bond other than those held by the
obligees named in the bond. See, e.g., National Am. Bank v. Southcoast Contractors, 276 So. 2d 777 (La.
Ct. App. 1973).
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tractor, even though a third party beneficiary of the defaulting contractor's con-
tract, has no rights on the defaulter's performance bond.
In Healy Plumbing & Heatng Co. v. Minneapols-St. Paul Sanitary District, 92 the
court recognized the impropriety of such a third party beneficiary claim against
the performance bond of another contractor:
If a party not included within the class for whose protection the bond is given is permitted
to sue on a tort claim or on a claim not connected with the performance of the contract, It is
conceivable that the amount of the bond might be so dissipated that those for whose protection it is given
would be left without any protection at all. 93
2. Indemnfication Clauses. Another method of risk shifting is the use of indemnity
or "hold-harmless" clauses which eliminate the owner's cost of potential litigation
against the defaulting contractor. In their most limited form, such clauses require
contractors to defend any suit or pay any judgment arising out of their negligent
acts or omissions. At the other end of the spectrum, some agreements require the
contractor to indemnify the owner even when the contractor is not responsible for
the loss. In between, there exist "intermediate" clauses which bind the contractor
to pay if he is responsible for any part of the negligence leading to damage or
injury. However, the utility of such clauses is severely diminished by state legisla-
tion; more than half of all states have legislation which prohibits or modifies lia-
bility under hold-harmless provisions when the injury or damage arises solely from
the negligence of the party whose liability would be extinguished by the clause.
94
Some of these same states will invalidate "intermediate" hold-harmless provisions
where there is joint liability with the party indemnified.
3. Performance Guarantees. Another provision which may be written into the con-
tract to protect the owner is a contractor's guarantee of his own performance.
There exists, however, some strong judicial resistance to allowing owners, contrac-
tors, architects, and other members of the construction industry to freely allocate
contractual responsibility among themselves. 9
5
In a recent California decision, an owner sought to allocate any risk of error
from a design change to the party initiating the change, the contractor.9 6 The
92. 284 Minn. 8, 169 N.W.2d 50 (1969).
93. Id at 16, 169 N.W.2d at 55 (emphasis added); see also J. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren,
Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544, 549-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
94. BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 15, at 304, lists the following states: California, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
95. Warranty law, when applied to construction contracts, is complex for the same reasons the con-
struction process itself is complex: There are many parties, all with strongly divergent interests, yet all with
interdependent responsibilities. Moreover, construction warranties partake of some of the characteristics of
a sale of services, to which the UCC's warranty law is inapplicable, and some of the characteristics of UCC
sales of goods; they are hybrids. For this reason, in some states only express warranties will be recognized
on construction contracts; in other states both express and implied warranties will be recognized. More-
over, some states will use the UCC to imply a warranty, some will use it only by analogy, and some will
reject it and rely on the common law to determine if a warranty exists. See Air Heaters v. Johnson Elec.,
258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977), for an example of a more "modern" decision describing circumstances under
which an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be applicable to a construction contract.
96. Habenicht & Howlett v. Jones-Allen-Dillingham, No. I Civ. 46449 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1981).
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court of appeals refused to give full legal effect to the contractor's performance
guarantee on the basis that "[c]ontractors are not guarantors of the quality of
designs furnished to them by an architect. '9 7 The court relied on two decisions 98
which held that when plans and specifications are furnished by an architect to a
contractor and must be followed precisely, any "guarantee" by the contractor
referring to performance merely constitutes a statement of purpose and extends
only to workmanship. Moreover, because the architect's errors and omissions car-
rier insured only against negligent errors and because the error here was a nonneg-
ligent one, the insurance would not cover the loss.
Because the court of appeals' and the lower courts' opinions negate the effect of
the language of an express performance guarantee agreed upon by the parties, the
sufficiency of performance guarantees in allocating risks is questionable. The
ability of parties to delegate responsibility for coordination is similarly open to
judicial manipulation.
4. Errors and Omissions Insurance for Design Professionals. 99 Architects and engineers
are clearly agents of the owner in the construction process. For this reason,
whatever claims can be brought against these professionals can be brought against
the owner as well. The risk is shifted by insuring the professionals with errors and
omissions insurance.
In recent years, however, the cost of architects' and engineers' professional lia-
bility insurance has increased dramatically while the coverage has been restricted
severely by exclusions. t0° Thus, if an owner is held liable to a third party as a
result of advice from the architect to the owner, and if the architect subsequently
becomes judgment-proof for any reason, the owner is without recourse should the
acts of the architect fall into any of the numerous exceptions to coverage. A more
It seems especially appropriate for a contractor to bear responsibility for guaranteed performance where, as
in the Habemcht case, the contractor's expertise concerning the design at issue is superior to that of the
architect. See J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS (1970).
97. Habenicht & Howlett v. Jones-Allen-Dillingham, No. I Civ. 46449, slip op. at 11 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 1981).
98. Bush v. Jones, 144 F. 942 (3d Cir. 1906), and Kurland v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d
112, 59 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1967).
99. This article will not consider "builder's risk insurance," which protects the structure against loss
during construction, nor "general liability" insurance, which protects the public from bodily injury or
property damage.
100. The typical policy excludes coverage for the following: performance of services not customary to
the architect or engineer, the giving of insurance and bonding advice, the failure to complete work on time,
projects in which the professional has any ownership interest, express warranties or guarantees, inaccuracy
of estimates of probable cost, projects in which the professional performs any construction, and projects for
which the professional's compensation is contingent in whole or in part on the sale of units based on the
design. Hapke, Constructon Industry Contracts, 23 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 249, 255 (1979).
Most, if not all, errors and omissions insurance policies available to architects in the United States are
written on a "claims made" basis. Therefore, there is the possibility that a claim made several years
after completion of construction will not be covered if the architect has been cancelled or discontinues
the insurance after performing the work of the agreement. An architect might be very reluctant to
agree to carry errors and omissions insurance for an extended time beyond his performance under the
agreement.
Berg & O'Leary, Preparation of Owner-Architect Agreements From the Owner's Vewpoint, in BUSINESSMAN'S
GUIDE, supra note 15, at 69, 88.
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serious trend has seen some architects and engineers decide that the cost of errors
and omissions coverage exceeds its practical value and begin practicing their pro-
fessions "naked," i.e., without insurance coverage. 0 1 In the absence of legislation
requiring architects and engineers to carry errors and omissions insurance, those
individuals who make an economic decision not to carry insurance may force
owners to pay claimants the difference over what the claimant can collect from the
architect or engineer for a wrong committed by that professional.
B. Allocation of Risk of Nonnegligent Error
One major gap in the protection provided by suretyship and insurance occurs
when a problem cannot be traced to the error of any one person. None of the
mechanisms described above allocates the risk of nonnegligent error. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate this situation as it affects the architect, the owner, the
CM, and the contractor.
The general problem can be seen by postulating a situation in which advice is
erroneous but nonnegligent and the owner must pay all the damages. One such
scenario occurs when, based on the advice of the architect and engineer, the CM
advises the owner to withhold payment to the contractor. It is later determined
that the advice, although nonnegligent, is erroneous and caused loss to the con-
tractor. After the contractor sues the owner and recovers in full, the owner looks in
vain for reimbursement. The owner may not recover against his CM because
under the AGC, AIA, and GSA PBS contracts, the CM does not warrant his
advice. The owner cannot recover against the CM's surety because the bond does
not cover erroneous professional advice. The owner cannot recover against the
CM's errors and omissions carrier because the advice, although wrong, was either
not negligent or was itself based upon the reasonable advice of the architect or
engineer.
Even if the jurisdiction is one in which the architect or CM warrants advice (or
if this was expressly included in the owner/CM or CM/architect contracts),° 2 the
owner is not fully protected. Suppose that after the contractor recovers from the
owner, the owner recovers from the CM, who in turn recovers from the architect.
The architect will bear the loss because his errors and omissions policy does not
cover contractually assumed liabilities such as warranted advice. If the CM
becomes bankrupt, the owner can still recover from the architect because the war-
ranties of advice flow through the CM to the owner, the third party beneficiary of
101. A survey by the American Consulting Engineers Council in 1980 found that an estimated 15% of
the firms that are members of that organization have decided to "go naked." Moreover, it is becoming
harder and harder for the design professional to obtain errors and omissions insurance. See Fisher, The
Contract Documents From the Developer's Point of View, in REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTION CURRENT PROBLEMS
127, 145-47 (PLI ed. 1973). For a discussion of the propriety of insurance as a device for spreading the risk
of liability for a professional's negligence, see Besser, Przoiy?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liabih of Account-
ants to Third.Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507, 534-37 (1976). This has been described as an "enterprise
liability" approach, funneling down the ultimate burden until it reaches the consuming public. Id. at 534
n. 14.
102. At the present time, there are no states in which the CMs or architects warrant the sufficiency of
their advice.
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the CM/architect contract. Yet if the CM and the architect both become bank-
rupt, the owner bears the loss and cannot recover against any surety or carrier.
It must be questioned why the CM or architect cannot be insured for nonnegli-
gent error. Why should the architect be protected from his negligence and not, a
fortiori, his nonpreventable errors? The carrier need not insure these parties
against all contractually assumed liabilities, but it would seem to be good eco-
nomic policy to spread the risk of nonnegligent error throughout the industry
through the use of insurance coverage. If such coverage is unavailable in the stan-
dard insurance market, the technique of self-insurance should be used and perhaps
be made mandatory when the possibility of loss is remote. A law requiring such
insurance could be modeled on state "financial responsibility" laws for
automobiles. Some local agencies have already required that before construction
begins, the architect must file a certificate of insurance with the owner. It should
not be difficult to include nonnegligent error under such mandatory policies.
V
RECOMMENDATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The judicial resistance to delegation of duty and allocation of risk presents a
barrier to obtaining the benefits from one of the fastest growing and most innova-
tive construction ideas in recent years-construction management. A redefining
of the roles is consonant with the public policy of distributing risks throughout the
enterprise of construction.
The owner should be held responsible only for matters within his control, such
as site information, site access, and payment. Courts should continue to imply
duties to not actively interfere with the performance of work and to use reasonable
care in the selection of the CM.
10 3
In delegating the duty of coordination to the CM, the owner should be relieved
of liability for delays in the construction process. Some concern may arise that this
result might lead to less vigilant coordination and a resulting inefficiency in the
work's progress. It should be recognized, however, that the modern-day owner is
not in the. best position to coordinate the construction work anyway. First, the
owner lacks the construction knowledge and expertise to coordinate the work effec-
tively. Furthermore, few nonprofessional owners have the time to exercise the per-
sonal supervision over the work essential to proper coordination. Therefore, a shift
of the duty would result in more efficient coordination. Should, however, the
owner intervene and begin to exercise control over the progress of the work, he
would be held liable for damages caused by his active interference.
The CM should have the responsibility in the contract for scheduling, coordi-
nation, and timely completion of the work. As a professional, the CM should be
liable for any negligent errors or omissions in the performance of his work. The
CM, in assuming the responsibility for coordination of the job, would be exposed
to the greatest liability. The owner could sue directly on his contract with the
CM, while the prime contractors could sue the CM on a third party beneficiary
103. See, e.g., Natkin & Co. v. George A. Fuller & Co., 437 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
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theory. Thus, the CM would have the greatest incentive to perform his job well.
This result, in turn, would serve the interests of both the owner and the prime
contractors. It would remove the anticipation of litigation which may lead each
party to protect his own interest at the expense of the earliest completion of the
job. Moreover, the CM's professional perspective would lend a certain detachment
that would inure to the benefit of all the parties.
With the CM having effectively taken over coordination, the architect could
return to the duties in which he is most skilled-those involving design. The archi-
tect should be held to the standard of due care applicable to any professional.
However, if allocation of risk among the parties is to succeed, traditional means
of risk shifting must be brought into line simultaneously. The CM cannot bear the
potential exposure to extensive litigation which will necessarily result without pro-
tection by insurance carriers. Premiums could be shared by all the parties as costs
of doing business. Any attempt to spread the risk to which the owner is exposed
will fail in the absence of proper professional insurance taken by the architect,
engineer, and CM. In the 1980's, however, many construction professionals do not
carry malpractice insurance because they deem it inordinately expensive. With
the tremendous rise in the use of the construction management method, exposure
to liability is bound to increase dramatically. Thus insurance coverage (without
myriad exceptions to weaken its effectiveness) becomes even more vital.
The expansion of errors and omissions coverage to include nonnegligent error
would be a progressive step in terms of public policy. Since such an error, by
definition, cannot be avoided even with the exercise of due care, forcing one party
to bear the loss is inefficient and inequitable. Allowing the parties to spread the
risk of unavoidable error reduces the cost of construction in the long run.
Much can be written on the advantages of requiring a performance and pay-
ment bond from a surety. The shifting of the risk to the surety assures completion
of the contract or defrayal of the owner's costs within the bond penalty, thus
allowing the owner to fix his cost at the contract price. These bonds also assure
compliance with the plans and specifications, thus affording protection against
defective workmanship and materials. Each state should enact the two-bond
system for the protection of all the parties. Beneficiaries of the bond should be
restricted to the named obligees and third party beneficiaries should not be
implied in violation of the parties' expectations.
To facilitate enforcement of his duty to coordinate, the CM should be able to
become a second obligee on the performance bond of the contractor. This could
be accomplished by including in the price of the bond the additional cost of an
extra obligee.
There should be no reason to fear the extension of performance bond protec-
tion to the owner to cover all of the contractor's liability, eliminating a per se
discharge of the surety due to actions of the owner. The performance bond should
cease to become coextensive with the liability of the contractor only when the
owner has acted in a way prejudicial to the surety's security. Both the surety and
the owner would then receive maximum protection of their interests.
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VI
CONCLUSION
The main practical advantage of the construction management approach is
that a single party answerable only to the owner is responsible for the timely com-
pletion of the entire project within budget and in accordance with the plans and
specifications. However, the courts in their interpretation of construction manage-
ment agreements and the other contracts involved have either not perceived or not
accepted the legal implications of this significant shifting of duties. Thus, the pri-
mary disadvantage of the construction management approach today is that as yet
it is not well nor uniformly defined. A project-by-project education process is nec-
essary to inform all the actors as to each one's duties and liabilities in this new
arrangement. To the extent all possible problems are not anticipated and agreed
upon in writing in advance, there is little direct legal precedent to aid in the reso-
lution of disputes. While analogies may be made to traditional areas of the law,
they are often made in a most tortuous manner. Thus, all parties should be
encouraged, while drawing up contracts, to anticipate the legal problems outlined
herein. By doing so, they may avoid being placed at the mercy of courts which
may not understand today's changing relationships in the construction industry.
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